- Description:
- Firecracker with the chroot.dev fixes, branch chroot
- Last Change:
- Clone URL:
ssh://anon@got.v6.chroot.run/firecracker
- ED25519:
SHA256:7587EKj+viWIfWGzPGNqUFSdFEh83CZFaqnwaoNmcNc
Commit Briefs
test: exclude IA32_DEBUGCTL from cpu-template-helper MSR check (firecracker-v1.15)
test_cpu_config_dump_vs_actual compares the cpu-template-helper dump (Firecracker's initial CPU config) against the MSRs read from a running guest. On 6.18 hosts, KVM virtualizes bus lock detection, so the guest kernel enables it at boot and sets DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT (bit 2) in MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTL (0x1d9). The dumped value is still 0, so the actual guest value (0b100) no longer matches. IA32_DEBUGCTL is a R/W MSR modified by the guest OS at runtime, so add it to MSR_EXCEPTION_LIST alongside the other guest-modified R/W MSRs (e.g. MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL). (cherry picked from commit b1f3e37e81e38467168d1851e28bc0865dcea092) Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson <jackabt@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
test: fix host-vs-guest CPU feature expectations on 6.18 hosts
Running test_host_vs_guest_cpu_features on a 6.18 host surfaced a few stale expectations that were not covered when the 6.18 sets were added: - All x86 models (Intel Ice Lake, Intel Sapphire/Granite Rapids, AMD Milan and AMD Genoa): v6.6+ drops the "invpcid_single" synthetic flag, so a 6.18 host (>= 6.6) no longer reports it while our < 6.6 guests still synthesize it. Expect it as a guest-only feature in that case [1]. - AMD Genoa: KVM advertises AMD PerfMonV2 to guests since v6.5, so a 6.18 host passes "perfmon_v2" through. The guest only reports it if its kernel knows the flag (added in v5.19), so drop it from the host-only set for guests >= 5.19 and keep it for older guests (e.g. 5.10) [2]. - Intel Sapphire/Granite Rapids: KVM now advertises IBT to the guest, so "ibt" is no longer host-only for guests new enough to know the flag (added in v5.18). Additionally, the 6.18 Granite Rapids host enables split lock detection, which is host-only since the guest cannot read MSR 0x33. [1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54e3d9434ef61b97fd3263c141b928dc5635e50d [2]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a2771895ca6 (cherry picked from commit 93e1a365d462f2ccaadf797d1a7c6bda89e2a58c) Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson <jackabt@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
test: Update CPU features host-vs-guest expectations for kernel 6.18
Amazon Linux 6.18 host kernel changes which CPU feature flags appear in /proc/cpuinfo. Update test_host_vs_guest_cpu_features expected host-only flag sets for each x86 CPU model when running on host kernel >= 6.18: (cherry picked from commit 2440dbb2354dc5a5734e67f7f429530cdf2f8714) Signed-off-by: Jack Thomson <jackabt@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
style(tests): fix black formatting in test_vulnerabilities
Remove an extra blank line before the new SSBS erratum test that made the black style check fail. Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
fix(aarch64): re-enable CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386 in guest kernels
The CI guest kernel config disabled the ARM erratum 3194386 workaround because the original erratum list only covered CPUs we did not use. The list was later extended to all Graviton generations (Neoverse N1/V1/V2/V3), so the workaround is required for reliable Spectre-v4 mitigation: without it, an MSR write to the SSBS special-purpose register is not self-synchronizing and may not affect subsequent speculative instructions. Re-enable the workaround by removing the disable line from ci.config, restoring the upstream default (=y) for all CI guest kernels. With the workaround applied the guest kernel hides the "ssbs" hwcap from userspace, so drop the ssbs expectations from the aarch64 CPU-feature tests and add a test asserting the guest kernel detects the erratum (via the passed-through MIDR) and applies the workaround. Surgical backport to v1.15 of PR #6138 (mainline commits 06fbe6dfd, ba3b1bdb5, f90fa863a), adapted to this branch's test structure instead of cherry-picking, since the mainline commits depend on test refactors (#5902, #6013, #6115) that are not on this branch. Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
test: skip flaky hotplug tests on x86_64 5.10 hosts
test_virtio_mem_hotplug_hotunplug and test_memory_hotplug_latency intermittently fail on x86_64 5.10 hosts, where the GET /hotplug/memory API call exceeds the maximum duration assertion. Skip both there until the latency is investigated. Signed-off-by: Jay Chung <jaehoc@amazon.com>
bugfix: count groups towards BuildKite limits
Apparently pipeline groups count towards the 500 job limit per upload. With this commit, they are correctly counted. Signed-off-by: Marco Marangoni <mamarang@amazon.com>
test: allow BuildKite jobs to be split across multiple pipelines
BuildKite has a limit of 500 jobs per pipeline upload. With this commit, we can enqueue more steps by splitting the upload in multiple chunks with a new `--max-jobs` option. Signed-off-by: Marco Marangoni <mamarang@amazon.com>
fix(audit): ignore RUSTSEC-2026-0097
RUSTSEC-2026-0097 is an informational advisory about potential undefined behaviour within the `rand` crate. `rand` is a transitive dependency, pulled in by `uuid` and `proptest`. Our use of these crates cannot trigger the pre-conditions for this undefined behaviour. In particular, it relies on both the `log` and `thread_rng` features of `rand` being enabled: - uuid (1.23.0): does not enable `fast-rng` or `rng-rand` features, so it uses `getrandom` directly and never calls into rand. - proptest: uses rand 0.9 with `default-features = false` and does not enable the `thread_rng` feature, so the affected functions are not compiled in. This is a temporary patch and will be reverted when `uuid` and `proptest` update `rand` to `0.10.1` and `0.9.3` respectively. Signed-off-by: James Curtis <jxcurtis@amazon.co.uk>
chore: Fill placeholder for PR number of virtio PCI transport fix
The change was made privately, so the PR number wasn't available. Signed-off-by: Takahiro Itazuri <itazur@amazon.com>
Branches
Tree
README.md
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="docs/images/fc_logo_full_transparent-bg_white-fg.png">
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="docs/images/fc_logo_full_transparent-bg.png">
<img alt="Firecracker Logo Title" width="750" src="docs/images/fc_logo_full_transparent-bg.png">
</picture>
Our mission is to enable secure, multi-tenant, minimal-overhead execution of
container and function workloads.
Read more about the Firecracker Charter [here](CHARTER.md).
## What is Firecracker?
Firecracker is an open source virtualization technology that is purpose-built
for creating and managing secure, multi-tenant container and function-based
services that provide serverless operational models. Firecracker runs workloads
in lightweight virtual machines, called microVMs, which combine the security and
isolation properties provided by hardware virtualization technology with the
speed and flexibility of containers.
## Overview
The main component of Firecracker is a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that uses
the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) to create and run microVMs. Firecracker
has a minimalist design. It excludes unnecessary devices and guest-facing
functionality to reduce the memory footprint and attack surface area of each
microVM. This improves security, decreases the startup time, and increases
hardware utilization. Firecracker has also been integrated in container
runtimes, for example
[Kata Containers](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers) and
[Flintlock](https://github.com/liquidmetal-dev/flintlock).
Firecracker was developed at Amazon Web Services to accelerate the speed and
efficiency of services like [AWS Lambda](https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/) and
[AWS Fargate](https://aws.amazon.com/fargate/). Firecracker is open sourced
under [Apache version 2.0](LICENSE).
To read more about Firecracker, check out
[firecracker-microvm.io](https://firecracker-microvm.github.io).
## Getting Started
To get started with Firecracker, download the latest
[release](https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases) binaries
or build it from source.
You can build Firecracker on any Unix/Linux system that has Docker running (we
use a development container) and `bash` installed, as follows:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker
cd firecracker
tools/devtool build
toolchain="$(uname -m)-unknown-linux-musl"
```
The Firecracker binary will be placed at
`build/cargo_target/${toolchain}/debug/firecracker`. For more information on
building, testing, and running Firecracker, go to the
[quickstart guide](docs/getting-started.md).
The overall security of Firecracker microVMs, including the ability to meet the
criteria for safe multi-tenant computing, depends on a well configured Linux
host operating system. A configuration that we believe meets this bar is
included in [the production host setup document](docs/prod-host-setup.md).
## Contributing
Firecracker is already running production workloads within AWS, but it's still
Day 1 on the journey guided by our [mission](CHARTER.md). There's a lot more to
build and we welcome all contributions.
To contribute to Firecracker, check out the development setup section in the
[getting started guide](docs/getting-started.md) and then the Firecracker
[contribution guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md).
## Releases
New Firecracker versions are released via the GitHub repository
[releases](https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases) page,
typically every two or three months. A history of changes is recorded in our
[changelog](CHANGELOG.md).
The Firecracker release policy is detailed [here](docs/RELEASE_POLICY.md).
## Design
Firecracker's overall architecture is described in
[the design document](docs/design.md).
## Features & Capabilities
Firecracker consists of a single micro Virtual Machine Manager process that
exposes an API endpoint to the host once started. The API is
[specified in OpenAPI format](src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml). Read
more about it in the [API docs](docs/api_requests).
The **API endpoint** can be used to:
- Configure the microvm by:
- Setting the number of vCPUs (the default is 1).
- Setting the memory size (the default is 128 MiB).
- Configuring a [CPU template](docs/cpu_templates/cpu-templates.md).
- Add one or more network interfaces to the microVM.
- Add one or more read-write or read-only disks to the microVM, each represented
by a file-backed block device.
- Trigger a block device re-scan while the guest is running. This enables the
guest OS to pick up size changes to the block device's backing file.
- Change the backing file for a block device, before or after the guest boots.
- Configure rate limiters for virtio devices which can limit the bandwidth,
operations per second, or both.
- Configure the logging and metric system.
- `[BETA]` Configure the data tree of the guest-facing metadata service. The
service is only available to the guest if this resource is configured.
- Add a [vsock socket](docs/vsock.md) to the microVM.
- Add a [entropy device](docs/entropy.md) to the microVM.
- Add a [pmem device](docs/pmem.md) to the microVM.
- Configure and manage [memory hotplugging](docs/memory-hotplug.md).
- Start the microVM using a given kernel image, root file system, and boot
arguments.
- [x86_64 only] Stop the microVM.
**Built-in Capabilities**:
- Demand fault paging and CPU oversubscription enabled by default.
- Advanced, thread-specific seccomp filters for enhanced security.
- [Jailer](docs/jailer.md) process for starting Firecracker in production
scenarios; applies a cgroup/namespace isolation barrier and then drops
privileges.
## Tested platforms
We test all combinations of:
| Instance | Host OS & Kernel | Guest Rootfs | Guest Kernel |
| :------------------------------------- | :--------------- | :----------- | :----------- |
| m5n.metal (Intel Cascade Lake) | al2 linux_5.10 | ubuntu 24.04 | linux_5.10 |
| m6i.metal (Intel Ice Lake) | al2023 linux_6.1 | | linux_6.1 |
| m7i.metal-24xl (Intel Sapphire Rapids) | | | |
| m7i.metal-48xl (Intel Sapphire Rapids) | | | |
| m6a.metal (AMD Milan) | | | |
| m7a.metal-48xl (AMD Genoa) | | | |
| m6g.metal (Graviton 2) | | | |
| m7g.metal (Graviton 3) | | | |
| m8g.metal-24xl (Graviton 4) | | | |
| m8g.metal-48xl (Graviton 4) | | | |
## Known issues and Limitations
- The `pl031` RTC device on aarch64 does not support interrupts, so guest
programs which use an RTC alarm (e.g. `hwclock`) will not work.
## Performance
Firecracker's performance characteristics are listed as part of the
[specification documentation](SPECIFICATION.md). All specifications are a part
of our commitment to supporting container and function workloads in serverless
operational models, and are therefore enforced via continuous integration
testing.
## Policy for Security Disclosures
The security of Firecracker is our top priority. If you suspect you have
uncovered a vulnerability, contact us privately, as outlined in our
[security policy document](SECURITY.md); we will immediately prioritize your
disclosure.
## FAQ & Contact
Frequently asked questions are collected in our [FAQ doc](FAQ.md).
You can get in touch with the Firecracker community in the following ways:
- Security-related issues, see our [security policy document](SECURITY.md).
- Chat with us on our
[Slack workspace](https://join.slack.com/t/firecracker-microvm/shared_invite/zt-2tc0mfxpc-tU~HYAYSzLDl5XGGJU3YIg)
_Note: most of the maintainers are on a European time zone._
- Open a GitHub issue in this repository.
- Email the maintainers at
[firecracker-maintainers@amazon.com](mailto:firecracker-maintainers@amazon.com).
When communicating within the Firecracker community, please mind our
[code of conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).