- Description:
- Firecracker with the chroot.dev fixes, branch chroot
- Last Change:
- Clone URL:
ssh://anon@got.v6.chroot.run/firecracker
- ED25519:
SHA256:7587EKj+viWIfWGzPGNqUFSdFEh83CZFaqnwaoNmcNc
Commit Briefs
pci: add unit tests for MSI-X code (feature/pcie)
Also, drop some of effectively dead code that Cloud Hypervisor was using because they were not relying on KVM to handle interrupt controllers. Finally, fixup some error cases on guest reads which need to return all-ones when bad accesses happen. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: add unit tests for PCI bus accesses
Add a few unit tests to check the logic that accesses PCI configuration space via the PCI Bus. Ensure that negative cases are being handled properly. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: add unit test for BAR reprogramming detection
Make sure we detect correctly valid intents to reprogram (move) BARs. Also, make sure we correctly ignore buggy ones. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: add unit test for accesses to invalid registers
Make sure we handle correctly accessing invalid registers. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: add unit test for configuring MSI-X capability
Make sure that configuring the MSI-X capability in PCI configuration space works properly (configuration space is initialized as expected). Also, make sure that the implementation respects the read/write properties of the respective bits. Finally, fix logic in the code that adds capabilities to take into account properly the size of capabilities. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: add unit test for adding BARs in config space
Add a unit test for the logic that handles adding BARs for a device. Also, ensure that we check that the BAR index we are adding is within range before we use it to index the BARs vector. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
pci: remove unused members of the PciDevice trait
We are not really using the `as_any` and `id` members of the PciDevice trait. At the moment, only VirtIO devices and the PCI root port is implementing PciDevice and we are never iterating over the container of PCI devices. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
chore(clippy): enable warn for or_fun_call
"or_fun_call" warns us when a function is called in side a "*_or(...)" function. In this case the value is computed (which may be expensive), but is only used if the Result/Option is an Error/None. In these cases, using the "*_or_else" variant is the best thing to do. Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <mancio@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
refactor(pcie): avoid string format on good path
If a function is called in the `.ok_or`, this gets executed independently on whether the function succeeds or not, although the result is only used on failure. Replace it with a .ok_or_else to avoid a useless string allocation and memcpy. Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <mancio@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
fix(virtio-pci): check guest values for MSI-X vector
We should check that the MSI-X vector that a guest assigns to a VirtIO queue or configuration is a valid one. If it is a value bigger than the available vectors allocated for the device, it should not update the vector field and mark the corresponding vector to the NO_VECTOR value. Also, add checks in the MSI implementation for VirtioInterrupt trait, for making sure that we don't try to interact with out-of-range interrupt vectors. Signed-off-by: Babis Chalios <bchalios@amazon.es>
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README.md
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<img alt="Firecracker Logo Title" width="750" src="docs/images/fc_logo_full_transparent-bg.png">
</picture>
Our mission is to enable secure, multi-tenant, minimal-overhead execution of
container and function workloads.
Read more about the Firecracker Charter [here](CHARTER.md).
## What is Firecracker?
Firecracker is an open source virtualization technology that is purpose-built
for creating and managing secure, multi-tenant container and function-based
services that provide serverless operational models. Firecracker runs workloads
in lightweight virtual machines, called microVMs, which combine the security and
isolation properties provided by hardware virtualization technology with the
speed and flexibility of containers.
## Overview
The main component of Firecracker is a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that uses
the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) to create and run microVMs. Firecracker
has a minimalist design. It excludes unnecessary devices and guest-facing
functionality to reduce the memory footprint and attack surface area of each
microVM. This improves security, decreases the startup time, and increases
hardware utilization. Firecracker has also been integrated in container
runtimes, for example
[Kata Containers](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers) and
[Flintlock](https://github.com/liquidmetal-dev/flintlock).
Firecracker was developed at Amazon Web Services to accelerate the speed and
efficiency of services like [AWS Lambda](https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/) and
[AWS Fargate](https://aws.amazon.com/fargate/). Firecracker is open sourced
under [Apache version 2.0](LICENSE).
To read more about Firecracker, check out
[firecracker-microvm.io](https://firecracker-microvm.github.io).
## Getting Started
To get started with Firecracker, download the latest
[release](https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases) binaries
or build it from source.
You can build Firecracker on any Unix/Linux system that has Docker running (we
use a development container) and `bash` installed, as follows:
```bash
git clone https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker
cd firecracker
tools/devtool build
toolchain="$(uname -m)-unknown-linux-musl"
```
The Firecracker binary will be placed at
`build/cargo_target/${toolchain}/debug/firecracker`. For more information on
building, testing, and running Firecracker, go to the
[quickstart guide](docs/getting-started.md).
The overall security of Firecracker microVMs, including the ability to meet the
criteria for safe multi-tenant computing, depends on a well configured Linux
host operating system. A configuration that we believe meets this bar is
included in [the production host setup document](docs/prod-host-setup.md).
## Contributing
Firecracker is already running production workloads within AWS, but it's still
Day 1 on the journey guided by our [mission](CHARTER.md). There's a lot more to
build and we welcome all contributions.
To contribute to Firecracker, check out the development setup section in the
[getting started guide](docs/getting-started.md) and then the Firecracker
[contribution guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md).
## Releases
New Firecracker versions are released via the GitHub repository
[releases](https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases) page,
typically every two or three months. A history of changes is recorded in our
[changelog](CHANGELOG.md).
The Firecracker release policy is detailed [here](docs/RELEASE_POLICY.md).
## Design
Firecracker's overall architecture is described in
[the design document](docs/design.md).
## Features & Capabilities
Firecracker consists of a single micro Virtual Machine Manager process that
exposes an API endpoint to the host once started. The API is
[specified in OpenAPI format](src/firecracker/swagger/firecracker.yaml). Read
more about it in the [API docs](docs/api_requests).
The **API endpoint** can be used to:
- Configure the microvm by:
- Setting the number of vCPUs (the default is 1).
- Setting the memory size (the default is 128 MiB).
- Configuring a [CPU template](docs/cpu_templates/cpu-templates.md).
- Add one or more network interfaces to the microVM.
- Add one or more read-write or read-only disks to the microVM, each represented
by a file-backed block device.
- Trigger a block device re-scan while the guest is running. This enables the
guest OS to pick up size changes to the block device's backing file.
- Change the backing file for a block device, before or after the guest boots.
- Configure rate limiters for virtio devices which can limit the bandwidth,
operations per second, or both.
- Configure the logging and metric system.
- `[BETA]` Configure the data tree of the guest-facing metadata service. The
service is only available to the guest if this resource is configured.
- Add a [vsock socket](docs/vsock.md) to the microVM.
- Add a [entropy device](docs/entropy.md) to the microVM.
- Start the microVM using a given kernel image, root file system, and boot
arguments.
- [x86_64 only] Stop the microVM.
**Built-in Capabilities**:
- Demand fault paging and CPU oversubscription enabled by default.
- Advanced, thread-specific seccomp filters for enhanced security.
- [Jailer](docs/jailer.md) process for starting Firecracker in production
scenarios; applies a cgroup/namespace isolation barrier and then drops
privileges.
## Tested platforms
We test all combinations of:
| Instance | Host OS & Kernel | Guest Rootfs | Guest Kernel |
| :------------- | :--------------- | :----------- | :----------- |
| c5n.metal | al2 linux_5.10 | ubuntu 24.04 | linux_5.10 |
| m5n.metal | al2023 linux_6.1 | | linux_6.1 |
| m6i.metal | | | |
| m7i.metal-24xl | | | |
| m7i.metal-48xl | | | |
| m6a.metal | | | |
| m7a.metal-48xl | | | |
| m6g.metal | | | |
| m7g.metal | | | |
| m8g.metal-24xl | | | |
| m8g.metal-48xl | | | |
## Known issues and Limitations
- The `pl031` RTC device on aarch64 does not support interrupts, so guest
programs which use an RTC alarm (e.g. `hwclock`) will not work.
## Performance
Firecracker's performance characteristics are listed as part of the
[specification documentation](SPECIFICATION.md). All specifications are a part
of our commitment to supporting container and function workloads in serverless
operational models, and are therefore enforced via continuous integration
testing.
## Policy for Security Disclosures
The security of Firecracker is our top priority. If you suspect you have
uncovered a vulnerability, contact us privately, as outlined in our
[security policy document](SECURITY.md); we will immediately prioritize your
disclosure.
## FAQ & Contact
Frequently asked questions are collected in our [FAQ doc](FAQ.md).
You can get in touch with the Firecracker community in the following ways:
- Security-related issues, see our [security policy document](SECURITY.md).
- Chat with us on our
[Slack workspace](https://join.slack.com/t/firecracker-microvm/shared_invite/zt-2tc0mfxpc-tU~HYAYSzLDl5XGGJU3YIg)
_Note: most of the maintainers are on a European time zone._
- Open a GitHub issue in this repository.
- Email the maintainers at
[firecracker-maintainers@amazon.com](mailto:firecracker-maintainers@amazon.com).
When communicating within the Firecracker community, please mind our
[code of conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).